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Abstract 
This paper uses household data to investigate the determinants of demand for 
education in Tanzania and test whether these have changed during the 
government’s push for Universal Primary Education in the 2000s. We find that 
the abolition of school fees was followed by an overall increase in enrolment, yet 
the sustained importance of household’s consumption, livelihood and education 
indicates that the socio-economic standing of the household remains an important 
source of educational inequality. We also include estimated returns to education 
as an explanatory factor but find no indications that returns determine demand in 
Tanzania.  
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1 Introduction 
Achieving Universal Primary Education (UPE) is explicitly stated as one of the 
Millennium Development Goals and has been the focus of many policy makers in 
developing countries during the last decade. The benefits of increased education are 
well documented, not only at the individual level where education may provide a 
pathway out of poverty or improved health, but there is also evidence regarding social 
benefits of education such as higher growth levels and more rapid technology diffusion 
(see Rosenzweig (2010) for a recent discussion). Like many other developing countries, 
Tanzania has made a push towards UPE since the turn of the century and has seen both 
enrolment rates increase and attainment levels rise. We examine how the demand for 
education in Tanzania has developed during the recent UPE policy program. Drawing 
on existing theoretical and empirical literature, we aim to investigate if and how the 
importance of commonly suggested determinants of demand for education have 
changed in the new millennium. To this end we include variables to capture the costs of 
education, the benefits of education measured as the observed financial return to 
education in the economic context of the household, and, finally, the preferences for 
education. 
Using data from two nationally representative household budget surveys covering 
mainland Tanzania in 2001 and 2007, we find evidence that both direct and opportunity 
costs are important determinants of educational demand, as is the household’s level of 
consumption. In line with previous research we find that parents’ education and the 
child’s relationship to the head of household are important, which is indicative of the 
importance of household preferences. A key finding of the paper is the potential 
importance of social norms in determining demand. We find that the average level of 
education within the local community is a significant predictor of children’s education, 
which indicates that educational choices are affected by the views on education held by 
others within the community. 
Building on the recent empirical literature that attempts to establish correlation 
between financial returns to education and children’s schooling, by using estimated 
returns to education as an explanatory factor in the demand for education, we find that 
returns to education are not important in either period. Two explanations are proposed 
for this finding: returns to education appear to change considerably between the years, 
suggesting they may vary too much for a household to include in their decision making; 
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and households may still be unable to respond to higher returns to education due to  
credit constraints.   
As for the development of these parameters, we find that while the grade-for-age 
ratio of children have risen considerably over the years, there are no significant 
differences in the importance of the level of consumption, the choice of livelihood of 
the household,  the level of education in the community or the parents’ own education 
for children’s schooling. This indicates that the role of the socio-economic standing of 
the household has not changed between the surveys, and hence remains an important 
source of educational inequality. In other words, while the development after the push 
towards UPE indicates that the government has been successful in raising the level of 
education across the board, it seems to have been less so in terms of reducing 
educational inequalities.  
2 Background – conceptual framework 
2.1 Setting 
The Tanzanian educational system consists of seven years of primary schooling, 
followed by four years of lower secondary and two years of upper secondary. Although 
primary schooling is and has been formally mandatory, this has often not been complied 
with.  
Following low enrolment rates in the 1990s, the government of Tanzania adopted 
the Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP) at the turn of the millennium. 
The first stage of this programme was the adoption of the Primary Education 
Development Program (PEDP), which was introduced in 2002 with the initial goal of 
achieving UPE by 2005 (URT 2006). The quantitative goals of the programme have 
largely been met, with net enrolment in primary school being up from 53 percent in 
2000 to over 99 percent in 2008 (WDI online, 2010). However, quality indicators show 
conflicting trends. There has been increasing average pupil-to-teacher ratios and 
increasing drop out and repeat rates. Conversely, the textbook-to-pupil ratio has 
increased substantially, and resources devoted to training and material has increased. 
The negative indictors provide some concern that the government is repeating earlier 
mistakes. In the late 1970s, a similar push towards UPE temporarily increased 
enrolment rates, yet due to decreasing quality and low returns to education, the effects 
were unsustainable (Wedgwood 2007, World Bank 2010). However, recent results 
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indicate a better outcome this time. Students’ reading and mathematics tests, arranged 
by UNESCO sponsored organization SACMEQ, have shown increases in students’ 
achievements between 2000 and 2007 (SACMEQ 2005, 2010), suggesting that the 
Tanzanian government may have managed to sustain or even increased educational 
quality despite the massive increase in enrolment. 
Still, for this latest policy initiative to be successful, it is likely that the economic 
underpinnings for demanding education will need to have changed. By improving on 
the returns to education, the initial success of the program may be sustained. Likewise, 
helping families cope with the costs of education, including both direct and opportunity 
costs, and by changing the norms and attitudes towards education in society, one may 
reach an enduring improvement in educational outcomes. We now turn to developing a 
conceptual framework to help us address some of these issues.  
2.2 Conceptual Framework 
In organising the analysis we draw on the previous theoretical and empirical literature 
on the demand for education. We consider three core concepts in determining the 
demand for education: the direct and opportunity costs, the benefits/returns, and 
household preferences. These concepts help in understanding the basis for the analysis 
and rationale for inclusion of variables, even though it may not always be easily 
distinguishable which of these is at work. For instance, while a parent’s education is 
usually a very robust predictors of children’s education, this may be due to the 
household facing lower costs of, higher returns to, or stronger preferences for education. 
From a theoretical viewpoint, children’s education may be seen both as an 
investment and as a consumption good. To the extent that utility is derived directly from 
education, schooling can be viewed as ordinary consumption. However, education also 
yields longer term returns through higher future income and non-financial benefits such 
as better health. When deciding on the education of children, a household will arguably 
consider both the consumption value derived from schooling and the longer term returns 
to education, which will be affected by the economic context of the household, the 
quality of education, and the child’s innate ability. From the household’s perspective, 
the benefits of education will be weighed against the costs that come with sending 
children to school, i.e. direct costs (school fees and costs of transportation, school books 
and uniforms, for which there may be scope for economies of scale within the 
household) and opportunity costs (all foregone income or production the child could 
5 
 
have contributed to the household had he or she not been in school). 
2.2.1 Costs 
The UPE has resulted in a reduction in the cost side of the equation. However, although 
the government has abolished fees for primary schooling, these fees were already a 
small part of the overall costs of education. A number of papers on Tanzanian data from 
the 1990s found that school attendance had more to do with opportunity costs than 
direct costs (Mason and Khandker, 1996; Al-Samarrai and Peasgood 1998; Al-Samarrai 
and Reilly, 2000; and Beegle and Burke, 2004). Therefore, despite the drop in direct 
costs, the opportunity cost will arguably remain an important component of costs faced 
by household decision makers. While our data does not allow estimations of direct costs 
of education, we are able to test whether the role of opportunity costs have changed 
during the period.  
2.2.2 Returns 
Compared to the literature on costs, the importance of the benefits or returns to 
education in educational decision making is less well documented. In recent years there 
has been an increased interest in establishing the effects of the returns to education on 
the demand for education by explicitly estimating returns by means of a Mincer wage 
equation, and using it as an explanatory variable. However, we are unaware of any 
study that has tried to use these estimates in a nationally representative setting in Africa. 
Gormly and Swinnerton (2004) consider an urban setting in South Africa, while most 
other authors have focused on India. 
Notable evidence in the previous literature include Yamauchi (2007), who argues 
that the adoption of high yield variety crops caused a shift in returns to education in 
India and uses this to identify a causal effect of local returns to education on the demand 
for schooling. He shows that households learn about these returns from observing their 
neighbours – a finding also noted by Anderson et al. (2003) and Kochar (2004) in 
Malaysia and India respectively.  
However, some authors have also noted that among credit-constrained households, 
this effect is often missing as households may be unable to respond to higher returns to 
education. Gormly and Swinnerton (2004) identify a theoretical ambiguity regarding the 
sign of the effect of higher returns to education on schooling demand in credit-
constrained households. They show that while higher returns to education should imply 
a higher demand for schooling due to a substitution effect, there is also a negative 
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income effect stemming from the fact that a higher lifetime income may make 
households want to consume more today. If households are credit constrained, the way 
to increase consumption today may be to not send children to school. However, in their 
particular study of urban households in South Africa, they find support for a positive 
effect of returns on demand for education even among the poorest households. 
Contrasting evidence is found by Chambagwala (2008), who finds no effect of returns 
on educational demand among the poorest households in India whereas Kingdon and 
Theopold (2008) find evidence of a negative effect for boys among credit-constrained 
households in India.  
Other authors have looked at the effects of school quality variables that are likely to 
shift the returns to education on the demand for schooling in Tanzania, but have found 
no or only weak links. Beegle and Burke (2004) find no support for effects of school 
quality on demand, while Bommier and Lambert (2000) find that the quality of Swahili 
teaching has some effect on the length of children’s education, whereas the quality of 
mathematics teaching and the availability of school supplies do not. None of these 
variables are correlated with children’s school starting age at the standard five percent 
significance level.  
From the evidence available, there does not appear to have been any major changes 
in the economic context that ought to be responsible for any large shift in returns to 
education, and correlations between educational quality and schooling decisions have 
been found to be weak. Combined with widespread poverty and a likelihood of a high 
ratio of credit-constrained households in Tanzania, it is difficult to have a strong prior 
even on the sign of the effect of returns to education in Tanzania. 
2.2.3 Preferences 
Apart from deriving utility from future returns, households may also have a taste for 
education, i.e. they may derive some utility from children’s education per se. Such 
preferences are likely to differ among households as they depend on private notions of 
educational ideals, but they may also have a common component based on community 
norms regarding the desirability of education. We will explore whether changes in such 
household preferences have altered the demand.  
While households’ preferences for education are generally unobserved, studies have 
used proxies to test their impact on educational demand. Al-Samarrai and Peasgood 
(1998) find that girls in polygamous households in Tanzania have a lower probability of 
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going to school, while there is no such effect for boys, reflecting perhaps some cultural 
norms that influence the parents in their decision to educate their children. Another 
common factor used to proxy for preferences is parents’ own levels of education. 
However, while the educational levels of a mother and a father are likely to contain 
information about their preferences, they are also likely to be correlated with 
information they have on the benefits of schooling, and as Akabayashi and 
Psacharopoulos (1999) point out, more educated parents will be in a better position to 
help with homework, thus parents’ education also acts as a complement to schooling. 
Using the Tanzanian data we will explore potential channels of both household 
preferences and community norms in determining the demand for education. 
3 Empirical Strategy and Data 
3.1 Data 
This study uses data from two Household Budget Surveys conducted by the National 
Bureau of Statistics in Tanzania. Both surveys cover the whole of mainland Tanzania 
(i.e. they exclude Zanzibar). The first survey conducted in 2001 covered approximately 
20,000 households and the second survey in 2007 covered approximately 10,000 
households. Both surveys used almost identical questionnaires and followed the same 
methodology, yet they do not form a panel. Information was collected on household 
characteristics, including assets, housing and a one-month consumption diary; and on 
individual characteristics of all household members.  
3.1.1 Dependent variable 
Many children in developing countries start school at different ages and drop in and out 
of school, which makes it difficult to find a measure of schooling that corresponds to the 
actual investment made in education. Previous research has used a variety of measures 
of demand for education, the most common include enrolment, school attendance, 
number of hours spent studying, grade-for-age measures and test scores. Given the data 
at hand, we will use children’s grade-for-age ratio as our measure of educational 
demand. It is constructed by dividing each child’s highest grade attended by the grade 
the child is supposed to be in. The main advantage of this variable is that it captures 
information on the accumulated educational investments for a child.
3
 This variable has 
                                                 
3
 A problem with using the commonly utilised measure ‘enrolment’ in Tanzania is that many children do 
not start school at the official starting age, and drop in and out of school frequently. This means that a 
8 
 
properties that makes it possible to interpret it as the share of the ‘officially correct’ 
amount of education that a child has actually achieved.
4
 Within all age cohorts, it equals 
0 for children who have never enrolled in school and 1 for children who started school 
at the right age and moved on to the next grade after each year. For all children in 
between, it measures the share of the officially ‘correct’ years of education that they 
have attained. Hence, for a seven-year-old the official level is equal to 1 year of 
education, for an eight-year-old it is 2 and so on. In other words, to interpret the size of 
the correlations, an increase of ten percentage points in the grade-for-age ratio is 
equivalent to one-tenth of a year extra education for a seven-year old, two-tenths of a 
year for an eight-year-old and so on. 
3.1.2 Explanatory variables 
For ease of description, variables are discussed at their level of measurement 
(individual, household, village and ‘returns cluster’) in relation to our three main 
concepts of costs, benefits and preferences.  
Individual level. A number of child characteristics have been found to be important 
for educational attainment. Apart from gender and age, birth order effects may be 
influential. It is usually found that first-born children receive less education (at least in 
younger years), as there is often a greater need for them to stay at home and help with 
household chores, e.g. taking care of younger siblings. Theoretically, we therefore 
expect the opportunity cost for schooling to be higher for first-born children than for 
their siblings. Compounding this, younger siblings may receive help from older siblings 
with homework, thereby increasing their returns further. To account for these 
differences we include dummies for birth order
5
.  
There is also reason to believe that biological children may receive more education 
than non-biological children, due to different preferences or different expectations 
                                                                                                                                               
child who is not presently enrolled in school may very well have had more education than one who is. 
Joshi and Schultz (2006) use an alternative variable related to the grade-for-age ratio by constructing z-
scores of the highest grade attended within each age (and gender) group. This has the advantage of taking 
into account the dispersion in the grade-for-age ratio in higher cohorts. However, limitations are that its 
size is less straightforward to interpret and that it is not evident that the distribution of the z-scores fits the 
data in estimable models any better than the grade for age measure. Given the strengths and limitations of 
the different variables, we will use the grade-for-age ratio as our benchmark measure of education and use 
other measures in robustness checks.  
4
 The exception would be children who have a grade-for-age ratio higher than 1. Few children have that 
though, and the ratio can then be (equivalently) interpreted as a multiplicative factor. 
5
 It should be noted that we do not have any information on children who have moved out of the 
household. Hence, we cannot confirm that the oldest child in the household is also the first born. Our 
measure is ranked by age and should be seen as a proxy for birth order. 
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regarding future remittances among the household decision makers. Hence, we include 
dummies for each child’s relationship to the household head, including being the child 
of the spouse or the grandchild of the household head.  
Household level. There are also a number of household level factors that are likely 
to affect children’s education. The most obvious control necessary is a measure of 
income. We will use the log of consumption per adult equivalent. The reason for its 
inclusion is that apart from being indicative of possible credit constraints hindering 
children from going to school, a higher consumption level should lower the marginal 
utility of the financial net effect of education, thereby possibly giving a higher relative 
weight to utility derived directly from education. We also include parents’ education as 
these may affect both preferences and returns, as discussed before.   
Variables on households’ productive assets that may shift the marginal productivity 
of child labour and hence the opportunity costs of education are also included. These 
variables include the log of the value of working capital  and the log of the area of land 
owned or used for agriculture, both measured per adult in the household.
6
 While these 
may be good proxies for opportunity costs in households engaged in agricultural or own 
business, they are less so for wage earning households. Hence, we include dummies for 
different livelihoods of households defined from statements on the main source of cash 
income for the household; namely, being involved in agriculture, having an own 
business, or being wage earners. If households believe that their children will earn their 
livelihood from the same activity, these dummies will capture both differences in 
opportunity costs and possible differences in expected returns to education. In addition, 
to proxy for the other costs of sending children to school we include two distance 
variables: the distance to the nearest primary school in kilometres – to account for 
transport costs (in money or time) – and the time it takes to fetch fresh water (in hours).  
Finally, we include variables on the demographics of the household: the number of 
children, which may affect the costs of schooling since siblings may be able to share or 
inherit school material; the number of adults; and a dummy for having at least one 
grandparent present, since grandparents may be substitutes for children in certain 
household chores and hence reduce the opportunity costs of schooling. 
Cluster level. In the next section we define a ‘returns cluster’ level where we divide 
                                                 
6
 In order not to lose households without capital or land, we add 1 to capital and the minimum non-zero 
area per worker (very small) in the sample before taking logarithms, and add two dummies for having no 
land and no capital respectively. 
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the sampled villages according to their location and an urban-rural distinction. At this 
level we introduce our return to education variable, described in detail in the next 
section. Importantly, we also construct a variable for the average level of education 
among the adults in the ‘returns cluster’. We do this as there is reason to believe that 
people’s decisions on education may be affected by the norms of the community in 
which they live, as these may affect the households’ preferences for education.  
By measuring the average level of education in different communities, we want to 
capture variation in social norms regarding schooling. However, a relationship between 
the average level of education among adults in the community and the decisions of the 
households regarding their children’s schooling may come about for several reasons7: 
parents may send their children to school because other parents tend to do so (what 
Manskie (1993) refers to as an endogenous effect); because other parents have a high 
level of education (an exogenous effect) or because the average level of education is 
correlated with other community or household characteristics that affect the educational 
decisions (correlated effects). Whereas the first two effects can be interpreted as 
representing related social norms (on sending your children to school and on the value 
of education respectively), the latter is potentially more problematic for our purposes. 
There are at least two concerns here. One issue is that a household in an area with a high 
average level of education may be expected to have a relatively high level of education 
and a relatively high level of income themselves. To deal with this, we include control 
variables in our estimations in order to capture such characteristics. The other concern is 
that areas with a high level of education may share other characteristics that relate to 
children’s schooling, such as a relatively high educational quality. We are not able to 
control directly for the quality of education, but  we do control for local returns to 
education which may capture quality differences in schools. As mentioned it can also be 
noted that previous research from Tanzania has found very weak, if any, evidence that 
the educational quality plays any major role in Tanzanian households’ decisions on 
children’s education, though this is of course not proof that quality is unimportant. 
3.1.3 The return to education 
To capture systematic variation in returns to education using cross sectional data, we 
want to group people together in a way that makes it plausible that they face similar 
returns within each group but different returns across groups. We do this by estimating 
                                                 
7
 A problem similar to what Manskie (1993) famously referred to as the ‘reflection problem’. 
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returns to education for specific groups defined by their location, including a measure of 
closeness to markets, and gender. The rationale for these dividing lines is that your 
location, closeness to market and gender will offer different possibilities in terms of 
livelihoods and hence possibly differing returns. Given the geographical size of 
Tanzania and the many ethnic groups in the country, there will likely be significant 
variation in returns by region. This is supported by evidence that sectors of employment 
are markedly different between Dar es Salaam and other urban areas, and even more so 
between urban and rural areas, where agriculture is overwhelmingly predominant 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2009). Poverty rates differ dramatically by region, and 
while they have almost halved in Dar es Salaam since 1991/92 they have changed only 
slightly in rural areas (National Bureau of Statistics, 2009). Taking this argument 
further, the economic context of different localities will differ depending on how 
connected an area is to wider markets. Localities close to markets will face different 
exposure to outside technology, different degrees of industrialisation, and different 
livelihood opportunities due to a potentially more diversified demand for goods and 
services. Likewise, different regions in the country may have different cultural contexts, 
be more or less connected to the world market, and have different production traditions 
in terms of both technology and the goods produced. Finally, the division along the 
gender dimension is motivated by the fact that men and women often have different 
traditional roles in production and hence may have very different returns to education.   
Mainland Tanzania is made up of 21 regions. We divide households within each 
region into urban and rural, which should capture a household’s closeness to markets. 
This gives us 42 potential groups based on region and ruralness. We call these our 
‘returns clusters’, and in each of these clusters we will estimate returns to education for 
men and women separately, giving rise to 84 different rates of return.  
3.2 Estimation Strategy 
In order to include the observed return to education as a predictor of the demand for 
education, we need to carry out our analysis in two steps. In the first step we estimate 
the return to education and in the second step we estimate the demand for education. 
3.2.1 Estimating the Return to Education 
We estimate the return to education within each returns cluster by means of an 
estimation similar to a standard Mincerian wage regression. However, unlike previous 
studies of returns set in Tanzania, which use wages from wage work as the dependent 
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variable (see e.g. Schultz, 2004; Söderbom et al., 2006; and Al-Samarrai and Reilly, 
2008), we will use consumption. We do this for several reasons. First, for most 
Tanzanians, wage-based estimates may be highly misleading as wage work is the 
exception rather than the rule, especially in rural areas. Investigating schooling for all 
children, we are interested in returns to education for the whole population and not only 
wage earners. Second, consumption fluctuates less than income as households’ smooth 
consumption in the presence of income shocks, hence being a better measure of the 
household’s permanent income. Third, using income data is problematic in developing 
countries due to the noise in its measurement, whereas consumption has the advantage 
of being more precisely measured.  
We measure a linear effect of years of education and use this as a benchmark 
estimate. Acknowledging that this may not be a completely accurate description of the 
returns, we use two alternative measures as robustness checks: a quadratic form and two 
dummies for educational attainment (one for having completed primary and one for 
having completed secondary education).
8
 Apart from the fact that a linear return gives 
more stable estimates, in the presence of convex or concave returns it will give us an 
average return based on the levels of education present in the community which seems 
to be a measure that should lie close to households’ expected returns.  
More formally, a standard Mincer style regression allowing for gender specific 
returns would be estimated at the individual level as: 
(1)   (            )                               , 
where    is a vector of control variables,    is a gender dummy, and      is years 
of education. In our data consumption is measured at the household level though, 
requiring a more aggregated estimation. Allowing for differing intercepts and returns 
depending on cluster, and following the methodology of Kingdon and Söderbom 
(2007), taking means over the working adult members of the household (anyone over 15 
who is not in school) would give us the equivalent model: 
(2)   (            )̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   
    ̅   
   ̅     
     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅     ̅, 
                                                 
8
 There is some evidence of convex returns to education in Tanzania (Söderbom et al. 2006), suggesting 
we use a quadratic function. However, this implies the need to evaluate returns at a specific level of 
education. Given that different groups in Tanzania have very different educational attainments (e.g. the 
share of people with university education in rural areas is extremely low), such a measure turns out to be 
imprecise, as the quadratic term makes predictions shaky when evaluated far away from the actual 
observations. The option to identify returns to having completed different levels of education leads to 
multicollinearity and in some cases rather shaky estimates. Given these caveats, we use the more robust 
linear form.  
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where a bar denotes averaging over household members. In this equation, the 
household mean of    (            ) is still unknown, however. Replacing the 
average of the log of consumption with the log of average consumption introduces a 
small error to the dependent variable yet makes the equation easily estimable as: 
(3)   (            ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)   
    ̅   
   ̅     
     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    
       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅     ̅. 
It is important to note here that the control variables in Xi should not include 
variables caused by education. For example, since a person’s education will affect his or 
her probability of different labour market opportunities and livelihoods, we do not want 
to condition consumption upon that – being a farmer or being able to get a wage job, 
and the effects that has on income and consumption, is part of the returns to education.  
Using estimates of returns from equation 3 assumes that households base their 
expected returns to children’s education on the actual outcomes of older generations 
who have finished school and are working, and on that they form these expectations 
using the outcomes within their ‘returns clusters’. This would be in line with previous 
research, which finds that the current state of returns within your local community 
indeed affects expected returns (Jensen, 2008; Yamauchi, 2007).  
The most commonly noted problem of estimating returns to education is the 
potential existence of an ability bias in the returns equation, i.e. that people with a 
higher unobserved ability will also get more education, making education correlated 
with the error term leading to biased estimates of the returns parameters. One solution to 
biased estimates is to instrument for education. We argue that there are at least two 
reasons why instrumentation may not be a good thing for the purpose of this study. 
First, as Yamauchi (2007) argues, people cannot learn about returns to education by 
observing themselves, as there is no counterfactual outcome. Instead, they learn from 
others. Yamauchi shows that farmer households in India learnt about new returns to 
education brought about by the ‘Green Revolution’ by observing the actual outcomes of 
their neighbours. This implies that a Mincer style equation approach may better 
resemble the perceived returns to education than does an approach uncovering the ‘true’ 
returns. Second, the focus of the paper is not to establish the returns to education, but 
rather to examine how these returns affect schooling decisions. It need not matter if the 
returns to education are biased as long as this bias is not different between the different 
returns clusters.  
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3.2.2 Estimating the Determinants of Education 
To investigate the determinants of the demand for education, using OLS we regress the 
grade-for-age on our explanatory variables with standard errors clustered at the returns 
cluster level. We include in the analysis only children aged 7-15 – children below 7 
have rarely started school, and those over 15 have often moved out of the household 
(which could imply a serious selection bias). 
The benchmark estimation of child i’s educational attainment will be of the form: 
(4)                            
        
        
        
      , 
where C, H, V, and R are vectors of child, household, village and returns cluster 
level variables respectively, ε is a random error term, and the t subscript denotes survey 
year and is added to underscore that estimations are undertaken with year-specific 
parameters.  
As it is not possible to send your child to school for a negative number of years, our 
dependent variable cannot take on values below zero. Since a linear specification can 
predict values below zero, and conceptually the marginal effects can be low for 
individuals close to 0, one suggestion would be to use Tobit rather than OLS to estimate 
the demand for education. However, a Tobit estimation requires that the dependent 
variable can take on values close to the limit (i.e. close to zero) or the results will be 
biased. In our sample, the majority of children have grade-for age ratios between 0 and 
1. Among the youngest children, where censoring is  most common, values close to zero 
are not possible: for seven-year-olds the lowest non-zero value attainable is 1, for 8-
year-olds it is 0.5, etc. There is also a growing literature that concern over functional 
form is less important than correct identification. Angrist and Pischke (2009) show that 
the interpretation of marginal effects present no special challenges whether the 
dependent variable is binary, non-negative or continuously distributed. Instead they 
argue that once output from nonlinear models are converted into marginal effects the 
differences in the OLS and nonlinear models are indistinguishable, concluding that the 
complexities that arise from nonlinear models outweighs the advantages of using 
standardized OLS estimates. We therefore present our OLS estimates in the main text, 
and the highly similar results from equivalent Tobit estimations in the Appendix.  
4 Results 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of our variables in the samples of children for both 
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2001 and 2007. Before turning to the demand for education estimations though, we will 
start by looking at the returns to education. 
4.1 Estimation of returns to education 
Table 2 shows the results from estimating equation 3. We regress the log of 
consumption per adult equivalent on age and age squared to capture life-cycle and 
experience effects, and the dependency ratio to control for households smoothing 
incomes over time, hence reporting higher consumption at times when there are many 
children in the household. There is an initially positive but decreasing effect of age, and 
a positive parameter on the dependency ratio. This is in line with expectations, and the 
results from both survey years are reassuringly similar. We estimate returns specific to 
each cluster and, as is standard in the literature, allow them to differ by gender, giving 
us 84 different returns. Since it is not feasible or useful to present all 84 returns, Table 2 
only reports the estimated returns for region 1 (Dodoma region).  
Table 3 summarises the estimated returns to education by gender and location. The 
returns to education are, on average, similar between urban and rural areas and between 
men and women, yet tend to be slightly higher for men and in urban areas. F-tests of all 
84 estimated returns being equal is firmly rejected at the one percent level in both the 
2001 and 2007 samples, and hence we conclude that there is strong statistical evidence 
that the returns clusters have differing returns to education. However, the correlation 
coefficient between the clusters’ returns in 2001 and 2007 is only 0.13, with a p-value 
of 0.25, indicating a low level of correlation over the years. Hence, it seems that the 
pattern of returns to education may have changed over time, also suggesting that the 
present return to education in a community may be a poor predictor of future returns. If 
households realise this, it seems to make little sense for them to make use of the present 
return to education in their schooling decisions. Whether they do or not is a question for 
the empirical analysis, to which we now turn.  
4.2 Determinants of the demand for education 
Figure 1 shows the share of children currently enrolled in school by age cohort in 2001 
and 2007, and Figure 2 shows the average grade-for-age ratios at different ages for each 
year. Both enrolments and grade-for-age ratios increased from 2001 to 2007, and 
especially so for the youngest children. This is expected as the youngest children are 
most likely to have been fully affected by the measures taken by the government in the 
PEDP, and were the ones lagging furthest behind prior to the programme. 
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Following our conceptual framework, Table 4 presents the results of estimations on 
key returns, costs and preferences variables separately, both with and without control 
variables, for 2001 and 2007. Column 5 reports the differences in the coefficients 
between the two years (for the estimations with controls), and the statistical significance 
of these differences. For ease of presentation, the coefficients on controls are only 
reported in the full estimation in Table 5.  
4.2.1 Returns to education 
Beginning with returns in Table 4, with and without controls, we report that returns to 
education do not seem to have a statistically significant impact on schooling in either 
year. Nor is the difference between these coefficients significant. The coefficients are 
not only statistically insignificant, given the small standard deviation of returns, they are 
also very small.  
We argue that this finding is perhaps not surprising in this setting. First, as noted in 
Section 2, the effect of higher returns to education is theoretically ambiguous in the 
presence of credit constraints (Gormly and Swinnerton, 2004). As many Tanzanian 
households are poor and can be believed to be credit constrained, the absence of an 
effect is consistent with both theory and previous research, which has tended to find 
insignificant or negative returns among the poorest households (Chambagwala, 2008; 
Kingdon and Theopold, 2008). Second, the variation in returns in the 2000s may make 
it difficult for households to use this information when making decisions regarding 
schooling. Hence, it is possible that people’s expectations regarding returns are formed 
with respect to other information, such as children’s innate ability or the likelihood of 
migrating to areas with different returns. 
4.2.2 Costs of education 
Our most direct measure of costs of education, the distance to the nearest primary 
school, is negatively and statistically significantly correlated with schooling at the one 
percent level in all estimations of Table 4. This result remains in Table 5, which 
presents estimations for the full set of variables (but drops the returns to education 
which turned out to be insignificant and which is itself estimated,  biasing its standard 
error downwards
9
). However, the coefficient is fairly small – the 2007 estimate of about 
-0.002 in Table 5 indicates that an increase in the distance to school by one standard 
                                                 
9
 There are alternative ways of accounting for the fact that the return variable is estimated, but as we shall 
see the return variable adds little of value to the estimations, so it is more efficient to drop it. 
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deviation of 7.57 kilometres decreases the education attained by just 1.4 percentage 
points of the officially correct level. The impact is therefore limited, which is in line 
with other research; Filmer (2004), investigating 21 poor countries (including 
Tanzania), found that while the coefficient of distance to school is generally negative 
and significant, the size is typically small in relation to other determinants. On the other 
hand, the impact was significantly larger in 2001, when the point estimate was about 
150 percent greater, implying that living 7.57 kilometres further away from the closest 
primary school was predicted to decrease the education attained by 3.6 percentage 
points. Hence, it seems that the PEDP may have been successful in promoting 
children’s education among those living furthest away from schools. 
Opportunity costs of education are captured by a number of variables: those that 
involve household chores, those that free up time for children, and household 
demographics. The most common children’s household chore is collecting water. The 
time it takes to fetch fresh water enters as negative and statistically significant at the one 
percent level in 2001 both with and without controls in Table 4. For 2007, the 
parameters are similar but statistically insignificant. Table 5 yields similar results, with 
an insignificant parameter for 2007 but also an insignificant difference in parameters. 
Like distance to school, the coefficients for both years are small and has little impact; 
the (larger) 2001 parameter indicates that an increase in the water fetching time by one 
hour was associated with a decrease in educational attainment by 1.8 percentage points 
of the officially correct level.  
Productive assets are also assumed to increase the opportunity costs of schooling by 
raising the marginal productivity of child labour. In line with this, the log of land owned 
per working adult enters negatively and significantly for 2001 without controls in Table 
4, but loses its statistical significance with controls in 2007. The log of working capital 
per working adult enters positively and significantly in both years. However, in the full 
regressions of Table 5, the parameters of both land and capital ownership are 
statistically insignificant and insignificantly different between the survey years. It may 
be noted here that while such measures often come out as significant in the literature, 
the theoretical link to schooling is ambiguous. In itself, working capital may enhance 
the marginal productivity of child labour, but may also replace child labour in 
production. For instance a household that owns an ox plough or pesticide sprayer may 
have less of a need for child labour in agriculture. Additionally, with more land the 
schooling of children may be more important for future production.  
18 
 
Related to the measures of productive assets are the dummies indicating the 
household’s main source of cash income. In 2007, children in households relying on 
wage earning activities are estimated to have about 3.3 percentage points higher grade-
for-age ratio than those relying on agriculture, while the parameter for operating an own 
business is much smaller at 1.7. Both parameters were statistically insignificant in 2007. 
That of being a wage earner was both larger and statistically significant in 2001, when 
being the child of a wage-earner indicated an increased schooling of approximately 8 
percentage points of the correct level. This parameter is in line with the hypothesis that 
wage earners have less of a need for child labour in income-generating production. 
Children in other households may often have to help out in the fields or in the 
household business. The exact causal mechanism is unclear however. There is evidence 
that wage work in Tanzania has higher returns to education than own employment (Al-
Samarrai and Reilly, 2008), and it is widely believed that the returns in agriculture are 
even lower. Hence, it seems probable that wage earners may also have different 
expectations regarding the returns to education. Column 3 indicates that even though the 
point estimates were larger in 2001, possibly implying a decreased importance of family 
livelihood as a determinant for children’s schooling, the differences between the surveys 
are again statistically insignificant. 
In Table 5, we also see that birth order is expected to impact demand, which we 
interpret as an effect of first-born children often having to look after younger siblings. 
This parameter is negative and statistically significant in 2007 but not in 2001; the 
disadvantage of being the eldest child in the family has grown significantly over the 
years, indicating a level of education almost 4 percentage points (of the correct level) 
lower for first-borns than for younger children in 2007.  
Finally, as expected the parameter of household consumption is positive and 
statistically significant in both years. The sizes of the parameters are fairly small but 
similar in 2001 and 2007, implying a modest but sustained impact on the demand for 
primary education; the standard deviation of our consumption measure is approximately 
0.54 in both years, which implies a change in the grade-for-age ratio of approximately 3 
percentage points. This can be seen as support for the hypothesis that credit constraints 
are at play. It also suggests that preferences for education are less important relative to 
the marginal utility derived from child labour at lower income levels.  
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4.2.3 Preferences 
Returning to Table 4, we next consider preferences for education. The average level of 
education of the other households within the cluster is, as discussed, included as a proxy 
for shared common preferences for education in the community (such as social norms 
regarding education). The variable is large, positive and significant across all 
estimations. Introducing controls and other variables in the full estimation its size is 
about halved, yet it remains statistically significant at the one percent level, and predicts 
a 4.7 percentage point higher educational attainment in 2007 for each extra year of 
average education within the cluster. As the standard deviation of the average years of 
education is about 1.2 and the minimum and maximum levels are 3.2 and 7.5 years of 
education respectively, this implies a sizeable effect if interpreted as a causal 
relationship. This lends support to the hypothesis that people are affected by the 
standard norm regarding sending children to school. Turning to Table 5, the parameter 
keeps both its economic and statistical significance in the full estimations, and is still 
very similar in 2007 and 2001. This suggests that the government’s push for UPE does 
not seem to have affected areas of lower levels of education more than it has areas with 
higher levels, other than possibly through other variables included. Hence, it seems that 
while children in all communities are now expected to go to primary school to a larger 
degree, the relative disadvantage of living in low-education settings is sustained. As 
discussed in section 2, we cannot rule out that some other factors than community 
norms are also at play. However, such factors have been controlled for when possible. 
To the extent that there are persistent differences in the quality of education between 
clusters, this effect may be picked up by the return to education variable, and persistent 
supply of education effects should be controlled for with the distance to school 
included. But there could also be informational effects at play, as people living in 
clusters with higher educational levels may have a clearer picture of the benefits of 
education or may simply believe they have imperfect information and hence copy others 
who may have better information. If so, the stability of the parameter of the average 
level of education would indicate that any informational campaigns do not seem to have 
reached out to areas with lower education to any larger extent than to those with higher 
education. 
Moving on to the own parents’ educations in Table 5, the parameters of the 
educations of the child’s mother and father may also be interpreted as effects of 
differing preferences. Parents with higher education may have chosen to get an 
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education because they have higher preferences for education, or they have developed 
higher preferences due to their education. Either way, the parameters on parents’ 
educations are large, positive and stable over the years. The impact of the mother’s 
education tend to be higher than that of father’s; in 2007 a child with a mother with 
primary education is predicted to have approximately 9.5 percentage points higher 
grade-for-age ratio than one with an uneducated mother. This is a slightly stronger 
effect than that of having a father with at least secondary education. Yet, the impact of 
having a mother with secondary education is even greater (double that of primary). 
These parameters are not statistically significantly different in 2001 and 2007, but 
somewhat larger for the father and lower for the mother in the earlier survey. The 
difference between the mother’s and the father’s education may to some degree be a 
selection effect; women tend to have a lower level of education, thus their educational 
attainment may be a stronger signal of their preferences. However, it also follows the 
patterns in previous research. 
There are also strong negative effects of being the child of the spouse of the head of 
household (but not of the head) or some other related or unrelated child living in the 
household. For both groups of children, the expected grade-for-age ratio is much lower 
than for biological children to the head of the household; in 2007 a child of the spouse 
had a predicted schooling 17 percentage points of the correct level lower than that of a 
biological child. This is likely an effect of both preferences, and that the household 
expects to receive less remittance from non-biological children, and therefore does not 
see investment in their human capital as important. The latter may not be as applicable 
for the children of the spouse, as for completely unrelated children. In contrast to the 
large parameter of 2007, the 2001 parameter of being a child of the spouse did not even 
imply a 1 percentage point difference to biological children of the household head, 
indicating that non-biological children have actually fallen behind the others over time.  
Finally, in line with other research the coefficient for being male is negative, large 
and significant. This corresponds to previous research from Tanzania (Bommier and 
Lambert, 2000), which has found that boys tend to start school later than girls (hence 
the negative parameters) yet ultimately receive more education (which would show up 
in later years). This may reflect parents’ preferences (discriminatory preferences result 
in less education for girls), higher returns to pre-school experience from the household’s 
economic activities for boys (hence higher opportunity costs) and the existence of a 
bride price (higher returns to early education for girls). The negative effect of being a 
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boy is larger in 2007 than in 2001, though the difference is statistically insignificant. 
5 Conclusion 
This study set out to provide new evidence on the determinants of the demand for 
education in Tanzania and to see how these have developed during the push for UPE in 
the last decade. We have done so by utilising data from two household budget surveys 
conducted in 2001 and 2007 that cover mainland Tanzania. The focus has been on 
determining the importance of variation in the costs of education, the returns to 
education, and household preferences for the educational attainment of children of 
primary school age. 
Drawing on the existing theoretical and empirical literature, we include 
determinants of education that represent costs, benefits and preferences. There is 
evidence that direct and opportunity costs of children’s education are important factors, 
and there is some evidence that living close to school is significantly less important in 
2007 than in 2001. However, we also find that after the introduction of the PEDP, the 
role of family livelihoods have not changed significantly. Likewise, the level of 
consumption is still a significant determinant of demand. This indicates that despite a 
general increase in schooling, structural differences in educational attainment due to the 
economic standings of the households have remained largely intact over the period.  
The paper estimates local returns to education which is then used as an explanatory 
factor in the demand for education estimations. In contrast to a number of recent studies 
we find no evidence of effects of local returns to education on the demand for 
schooling. We argue that the decisions on primary education seem to be dominated by 
other factors than variations in local returns, and offer two explanations; households 
may be subject to credit constraints, which we see some evidence of with the size of the 
coefficient on consumption and in the importance of being a wage earner or involved in 
business, and we also note that local returns are volatile between periods, possibly 
making it difficult for households to use when forming expectations about future 
returns.  
We also find several factors thought to represent household preferences for 
education to be important, including determinants at both the household and community 
levels. The average level of education in the region of the household, indicative of some 
common preferences in the community such as social norms regarding education, has a 
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statistically significant and economically important predictive power with respect to 
children’s education, even when controlling for parents’ own education. Moreover, this 
disadvantage of living in an area with a lower level of education among the adults has 
been remarkably stable. In line with other research, we also find that some of the 
strongest determinants of educational demand come from parents’ characteristics. The 
relationship of the child to the household head, together with the effect of parents’ 
education (especially that of the mother), are strong predictors of educational demand. 
The evidence suggests that children born to well-educated parents who remain in the 
custody of their biological mother and father have significantly higher levels of 
education, and that this is just as important in 2007 as it was in 2001.  
The Tanzanian government seem to have been successful in its push towards 
universal primary education, but the sustained importance of consumption, livelihoods, 
the level of education in the community, as well as the parents’ own education, indicate 
that the role of the socio-economic standing of the household has not changed 
significantly between the surveys, and hence remains an important source of educational 
inequality. In this light, while a development of attitudes in favour of children’s 
education may bring positive feedback effects on the education of coming generations 
as future parents will be better educated, history has shown that there is also a risk that 
such progress may regress in the absence of substantial changes in the economic context 
in which the household takes its decision. While the present study find no significant 
correlation between the observed local financial returns to education and children’s 
schooling, there is of course still a risk that the accomplishments achieved during the 
PEDP may not be sustainable and that the experience of the 1970s therefore may be 
repeated.   
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 Figures and Tables 
Table 1. Weighted summary statistics of children in the demand for education samples.  
 2001     2007     
Variable Mean Sd Min Max  Mean Sd Min Max  
grade-for-age 0.39 0.42 0 3  0.66 0.41 0 3 
Return to edu 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.18  0.05 0.03 -0.05 0.16 
Ln area per worker -0.35 2.71 -7.31 6.21  -0.41 2.90 -7.17 4.67 
No area (dummy) 0.13 0.43 0 1  0.15 0.48 0 1 
Ln capital per worker 10.10 4.02 0 16.82  10.94 4.75 0 20.44 
No capital (dummy) 0.07 0.33 0 1  0.06 0.38 0 1 
Distance to school (km) 2.05 3.64 0 130  3.45 7.57 0 300 
Time to water (hrs) 0.41 0.64 0 20  0.66 0.83 0 8.1 
Mean cluster education 4.85 1.09 3.51 7.64  4.77 1.36 3.04 7.51 
Ln consumpt. per ad.eq. 9.07 0.54 7.43 11.00  9.78 0.54 8.27 11.61 
Wage earner 0.08 0.40 0 1  0.14 0.43 0 1 
Own business 0.12 0.42 0 1  0.13 0.41 0 1 
Other livelihood 0.10 0.34 0 1  0.08 0.30 0 1 
Male 0.50 0.50 0 1  0.51 0.50 0 1 
Oldest child 0.31 0.45 0 1  0.33 0.47 0 1 
Other child 0.09 0.32 0 1  0.09 0.30 0 1 
Child of spouse 0.02 0.15 0 1  0.03 0.15 0 1 
Grandchild of head 0.12 0.32 0 1  0.13 0.34 0 1 
No. of kids 4.48 2.52 1 33  4.29 2.13 0 16 
Grandparent present 0.20 0.40 0 1  0.18 0.39 0 1 
No. of adults 3.12 1.81 0 16  2.85 1.54 1 21 
Mother’s edu primary 0.44 0.50 0 1  0.49 0.50 0 1 
Mother’s edu secondary 0.03 0.28 0 1  0.03 0.25 0 1 
Father’s edu primary 0.38 0.49 0 1  0.45 0.50 0 1 
Father’s edu secondary 0.06 0.36 0 1  0.06 0.32 0 1 
Rural 0.82 0.49 0 1  0.77 0.49 0 1   
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Table 2. OLS Returns: Estimations for log consumption per adult equivalent  
 
Coefficient  (1) (2) 
(t value)  2007  2001  
Dependency ratio 0.128*** 0.132*** 
 (-0.004) (-0.006) 
Age 0.026*** 0.030*** 
 (-0.002) (-0.002) 
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) 
Male*Urban*Region1 1.308*** -0.343 
  (-0.222) (-0.313) 
Male*Urban*Region1*Education 0.067*** 0.110*** 
  (-0.011) (-0.026) 
Male*Rural*Region1 1.128*** -0.15 
 (-0.215) (-0.288) 
Male*Rural*Region1*Education 0.047*** 0.059*** 
  (-0.012) (-0.02) 
Female*Urban*Region1 1.421*** 0.024 
  (-0.212) (-0.296) 
Female*Urban*Region1*Education 0.060*** 0.058*** 
  (-0.009) (-0.021) 
Female*Rural*Region1 1.166*** -0.300 
  (-0.210) (-0.285) 
Female*Rural*Region1*Education 0.064*** 0.026* 
  (-0.01) (-0.014)  
Observations 19931 9366 
R-squared 0.28 0.34  
Note: Return to education is estimated specific to each combination of urban/rural, region and gender.  All 
variables are household averages. Due to space limitations, the estimation shows estimated returns to education 
and intercepts for men and women in urban and rural areas of region 1 (Dodoma) only; summary statistics of the 
returns in all 21 regions can be found in Table 2. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** 
significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
  
 
Table 3. Summary statistics of the estimated returns to education, by gender and urban/rural 
 2001     2007     
Cluster Mean St.Dev. Min. Max.  Mean St.Dev. Min. Max. 
Female Rural 0.054 0.013 0.021 0.076  0.024 0.029 -0.050 0.061 
Female Urban 0.068 0.011 0.040 0.092  0.063 0.029 0.007 0.116 
Male Rural 0.067 0.031 0.045 0.183  0.050 0.021 0.022 0.097 
Male Urban 0.070 0.014 0.041 0.096  0.083 0.037 0.003 0.163  
All 0.065 0.020 0.021 0.183  0.055 0.036 -0.050 0.163 
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Figure 1. Children’s average enrolment in 2001 and 2007, by age. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Children’s average grade-for-age ratio in 2001 and 2007, by age. 
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Table 4. Results of OLS estimations of children’s grade-for-age ratios in 2001 and 2007. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 2001 2001 2007 2007 Diff  
Returns    
Return to 0.157 -0.613 0.141 -0.175 0.438  
  education (1.031) (0.485) (0.355) (0.312) (0.601) 
Controls no yes no yes yes 
       
Observations 21,298 21,298 8,549 8,549 29,847 
R-squared 0.038 0.137 0.013 0.104 0.213  
  
Costs      
Ln area per worker -0.0202** -0.0112 -0.000942 0.00174 0.0130 
 (0.00874) (0.00723) (0.00657) (0.00780) (0.0102) 
Ln capital per 0.0147** 0.0107 0.0136*** 0.00805** -0.00263 
  worker (0.00723) (0.00643) (0.00415) (0.00400) (0.00663) 
Distance to -0.00866*** -0.00552*** -0.00431*** -0.00234*** 0.00318** 
  school (km) (0.00160) (0.00130) (0.00109) (0.000662) (0.00126) 
Time to water (hrs) -0.0299*** -0.0186*** -0.0225* -0.00622 0.0124 
 (0.00684) (0.00610) (0.0129) (0.0119) (0.0144) 
Controls no yes no yes yes 
       
Observations 21,298 21,298 8,549 8,549 29,847 
R-squared 0.068 0.139 0.046 0.108 0.124  
 
Cluster mean education     
Average education 0.0725*** 0.0479** 0.0735*** 0.0469*** -0.00104 
  among adults (yrs) (0.00925) (0.0185) (0.00814) (0.0130) (0.0196) 
Controls no yes no yes yes  
       
Observations 21,298 21,298 8,549 8,549 29,847 
R-squared 0.074 0.143 0.055 0.109 0.217  
Note: OLS estimations of children’s grade-for-age separately on returns, opportunity costs and the cluster 
average of years of education among adults respectively, with and without controls for 2001 and 2007. 
Estimation 5 estimates the difference in coefficients between the two samples. Controls included in estimations 
2, 4 and 5 are those included in the full estimation in Table 5 and are left out due to space limitations. All costs 
estimations also include dummies for having no land and no capital respectively. Standard errors clustered at the 
‘returns cluster’ level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 5: Full (weighted) OLS coefficients of the demand for education 2001 and 2007 – 
children’s grade for age 
Coefficient  (1) 2001 (2) 2007 (3) Difference  
Costs 
Ln area per worker -0.00697 0.00743 0.0144 
 (0.00721) (0.00820) (0.0109) 
Ln capital per worker 0.00820 0.00591 -0.00229 
 (0.00614) (0.00402) (0.00732) 
Distance to school (km) -0.00473*** -0.00189*** 0.00284** 
 (0.00123) (0.000681) (0.00140) 
Time to water (hrs) -0.0176*** -0.00250 0.0151 
 (0.00611) (0.0123) (0.0136) 
Mean cluster education 
Average years of education 0.0393** 0.0416*** 0.00226 
  among adults in cluster (0.0197) (0.0148) (0.0246) 
Child characteristics 
Male -0.0495*** -0.0708*** -0.0214 
 (0.0179) (0.0170) (0.0246) 
Oldest child 0.0138 -0.0388*** -0.0526** 
 (0.0151) (0.0135) (0.0202) 
Other child -0.118*** -0.0824*** 0.0355 
 (0.0191) (0.0184) (0.0265) 
Child of spouse -0.00696 -0.172*** -0.165*** 
 (0.0415) (0.0343) (0.0537) 
Grandchild of HH head 0.0435 0.0282 -0.0154 
 (0.0358) (0.0452) (0.0574) 
Household characteristics 
Ln consumption per  0.0664*** 0.0509*** -0.0155 
  adult equivalent (0.0138) (0.0136) (0.0193) 
Wage earner 0.0798** 0.0326 -0.0472 
 (0.0311) (0.0197) (0.0367) 
Own business 0.0401 0.0169 -0.0232 
 (0.0285) (0.0187) (0.0340) 
Other livelihood 0.00436 -0.00144 -0.00580 
 (0.0223) (0.0213) (0.0307) 
Grandparent present 0.0205 0.0449 0.0243 
 (0.0278) (0.0412) (0.0496) 
No of adults 0.00176 -0.0214*** -0.0232*** 
 (0.00412) (0.00589) (0.00716) 
No of kids -0.0108*** -0.00517 0.00562 
 (0.00288) (0.00355) (0.00456) 
Mother’s edu - primary 0.0847*** 0.0950*** 0.0103 
 (0.0167) (0.0123) (0.0207) 
Mother’s edu - secondary 0.129*** 0.182*** 0.0525 
 (0.0342) (0.0312) (0.0461) 
Father’s edu - primary 0.0410*** 0.00832 -0.0327 
 (0.0151) (0.0141) (0.0207) 
Father’s edu - secondary 0.139*** 0.0811*** -0.0584 
 (0.0254) (0.0287) (0.0382) 
Rural  0.0306 0.00172 -0.0289 
 (0.0414) (0.0305) (0.0512) 
Constant -0.489*** -0.135 0.355* 
 (0.162) (0.150) (0.218)  
Observations 21,298 8,549 29,847 
R-squared 0.148 0.111 0.221  
Standard errors (in parenthesis) clustered at the ‘returns cluster’ (by year, in Column 3) level. Additional controls 
included: dummies for age, having no land and having no capital.  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 10%. Additional variables: child age dummies.  
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Tobit estimation coefficients (Col 1-3) and their implied marginal effects at the 
mean of the other independent variables (Col 4-5)  
 2001 2007 Diff Mfx 2001 Mfx 2007 
Ln area per worker -0.0145 0.00970 0.0242* -0.00980 0.00893 
 (0.0107) (0.00980) (0.0146) (0.00726) (0.00900) 
Ln cap. per worker 0.0127 0.00677 -0.00597 0.008627 0.00623 
 (0.00929) (0.00468) (0.00993) (0.00627) (0.00432) 
Distance to school -0.00987*** -0.00282*** 0.00705** -0.00668*** -0.00259*** 
 (0.00317) (0.00103) (0.00298) (0.00214) (0.000951) 
Time to water -0.0329*** -0.00108 0.0319 -0.0223*** -0.000992 
 (0.0117) (0.0155) (0.0204) (0.00799) (0.0142) 
Mean cluster edu 0.0570** 0.0479*** -0.00907 0.0386** 0.0441*** 
 (0.0288) (0.0174) (0.0335) (0.0196) (0.0156) 
Ln cons. p. ad. eq. 0.105*** 0.0625*** -0.0427 0.0712*** 0.0575*** 
 (0.0200) (0.0158) (0.0269) (0.0135) (0.0145) 
Wage earner 0.0982** 0.0356 -0.0626 0.0692** 0.0329 
 (0.0444) (0.0240) (0.0529) (0.0325) (0.0223) 
Own business 0.0508 0.0183 -0.0325 0.0350 0.0169 
 (0.0411) (0.0216) (0.0426) (0.0289) (0.0200) 
Other livelihood 0.00241 0.00353 0.00112 0.00163 0.00325 
 (0.0351) (0.0248) (0.0468) (0.0238) (0.0228) 
Male -0.0658** -0.0830*** -0.0172 -0.0445** -0.0764*** 
 (0.0280) (0.0200) (0.0319) (0.0191) (0.0183) 
Oldest child 0.0143 -0.0479*** -0.0621** 0.00968 -0.0439*** 
 (0.0224) (0.0161) (0.0268) (0.0152) (0.0147) 
Other child -0.183*** -0.104*** 0.0793* -0.114*** -0.0937*** 
 (0.0324) (0.0240) (0.0450) (0.0189) (0.0211) 
Child of spouse -0.0204 -0.216*** -0.196** -0.0137 -0.190*** 
 (0.0730) (0.0475) (0.0813) (0.0485) (0.0390) 
Grandchild 0.0763 0.0459 -0.0303 0.0532 0.0425 
 (0.0571) (0.0565) (0.0775) (0.0411) (0.0525) 
No. of kids -0.0152*** -0.00484 0.0104 -0.0103*** -0.00445 
 (0.00442) (0.00429) (0.00653) (0.00305) (0.00395) 
Grandp. present 0.0293 0.0455 0.0163 0.0200 0.0421 
 (0.0439) (0.0511) (0.0723) (0.0301) (0.04759) 
No. of adults -0.00305 -0.0293*** -0.0262*** -0.00207 -0.0270*** 
 (0.00614) (0.00783) (0.00978) (0.00416) (0.00716) 
Mother’s edu -  0.141*** 0.111*** -0.0295 0.0959*** 0.102*** 
   primary (0.0263) (0.0148) (0.0291) (0.0185) (0.0136) 
Mother’s edu - 0.186*** 0.199*** 0.0123 0.137*** 0.188*** 
   secondary (0.0461) (0.0350) (0.0580) (0.0358) (0.0335) 
Father’s edu -  0.0725*** 0.0136 -0.0590** 0.0495*** 0.0125 
   primary (0.0233) (0.0169) (0.0258) (0.0162) (0.0155) 
Father’s edu -  0.201*** 0.0941*** -0.107** 0.148*** 0.0877*** 
   secondary (0.0333) (0.0315) (0.0496) (0.0258) (0.0297) 
Rural 0.0540 0.00437 -0.0497 0.0359 0.00402 
 (0.0593) (0.0344) (0.0659) (0.0389) (0.0316) 
Constant -1.106*** -0.314* 0.792***     
 (0.227) (0.173) (0.253)     
Sigma 0.522*** 0.450*** 0.522***     
 (0.0127) (0.00957) (0.0127)     
N 21,298 8,549 29,847 21,298 8,549  
Note: Standard errors (clustered at returns cluster level) in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
